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Abstract 
Anthropological kinship theory is explored for potential contributions to a theory 
of family business.  This paper considers the costs and benefits of a role for kinship in 
business.  Both derive from the discrepancy between the normative orders of kinship and 
markets; respectively, long-term generalized reciprocity and short-term balanced 
reciprocity.  Because the former reflects the morality of society as a whole, kinship 
integrates social fields more readily than more specialized orders like markets. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The greatest unutilized resource for advancing the field of family business studies 
is the large anthropological literature on kinship and marriage.  The purpose of this paper 
is to substantiate that claim.  It attempts to do this by seeking out and summarizing the 
findings and themes from that literature of likely interest to business school scholars, 
much as Stewart (1990, 1991) did for the anthropology of entrepreneurship.  It borrows 
the organizing schema of Mattessich and Hill (1976): the disadvantages and advantages 
of kinship in business. 
 One of the anomalies of the patchy fish-scale world of academe (Campbell, 1969) 
is that few if any family business scholars are familiar with the “kinship” studies field.  
Nor is there much sign of progress.  For example, Rosenblatt and colleagues (1985) cited 
few works by anthropologists, but at seven they cited more than the three in Gersick and 
colleagues (1997).  Similarly, a search of ProQuest for both “kinship” and “business” in 
any search field turned up seven peer reviewed articles, of which only one (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2000) uses the word kinship in this sense.  Despite this absence of cross-
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fertilization, family business writings frequently address topics compatible with 
anthropological treatment. 
 Judging from articles in Family Business Review, family business scholars share 
many interests with anthropologists.  For example, the attention by Perricone, Earle and 
Taplin (2001) to “cultural systems” does not appear unusual (see also García-Álvarez & 
López-Sintas, 2001; Hall, Melin, & Nordqvist, 2001; Moores & Mula, 2000).  A related 
topic that is also shared in anthropology is social capital and social networks (Steier, 
2001; Veliyath & Ramaswany, 2000).  Family business scholars seem, in fact, to be 
proto-anthropologists, writing extensively about many cultures, such as Portugal 
(Howorth & Ali, 2001), the Persian Gulf (Davis, Pitts, & Cormier, 2000), East and West 
Germany (Klein, 2000; Pistrui, Welsch, Wintermantel, Liao, & Pohl, 2000), India 
(Manikutty, 2000; Sharma & Rao, 2000; Ward, 2000), and China and the diaspora 
Chinese (Gatfield & Youseff, 2001; Lee & Tan, 2001; Pistrui, Huang, Oksoy, Jing, & 
Welsch, 2001; Tan & Fock, 2001).   By my count, the seventeen articles just noted cite 
669 works.  Of these, less than 1% (five, I believe) is anthropological. 
Perhaps this is not surprising.  Kinship theory can be a technical undertaking that 
glazes the eyes of even the anthropology major.  Still, substantial portions of these 
writings are relatively non-specialized and, I believe, compelling for the general reader.  I 
shall gravitate to these works and pay less attention to more technical matters.  Before I 
can do that, however, there is no escaping the need for something dull: a definition. 
What Is Kinship? 
 As one introductory book colorfully said, “Kinship is to anthropology what logic 
is to philosophy and the nude is to art; it is the basic discipline of the subject” (Fox, 1983: 
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10).  Clearly I cannot introduce the whole field; moreover, I could not improve on Fox’s 
book which, despite some limitations (Scheffler, 2001, p. 104, n. 5), is clear, thorough 
and well organized.  Other introductions include Keesing’s (1975) little textbook and, for 
those more inclined to postmodernist self-doubt, Holy (1996) and Stone (1997, 2001; see 
Peletz, 1995).  Harrell’s (1997) Human Families is a systematically evolutionary 
approach which, despite a title suggestive of family studies, is a work of anthropology. 
Definition.  Even if anthropologists were uniform in their theoretical and 
methodological views - far from the reality - the sheer variation in kinship across cultures 
and over time (Fortes, 1969, pp, 229-230; Harrell, 1997; Johnson, 2000; Schweitzer, 
2000b) would generate controversy over definitions.  My reading of the ethnographic 
record and the kinship debates leads me to follow Holy (1996, p. 40, also pp. 166-167) 
and “most anthropologists [in taking] kinship to be the network of genealogical 
relationships and social ties modeled on the relations of genealogical parenthood.”  Good 
(1996, p. 312) notes that most anthropologists add the qualification “biological kinship, 
as culturally defined by the society concerned.”  As Scheffler (2001, p. ix) adds, kinship 
in this sense is a “universal and often-extensive [factor]… in the constitution of human 
societies.”  A loose usage of the term “kinship” also includes marriage and affinity 
(relationships derived from marriage) - as does this article - but most kinship theorists 
make the distinction apparent in Fox’s (1983) title Kinship and Marriage.  
THE COSTS OF KINSHIP 
The moral character of kinship.  Kinship in modern complex societies is no 
longer the infrastructure for other functions, such as politics, law and religion.  Harrell 
(1997, pp. 458-490) even argues that only one of eight roles played by families across 
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time - emotional support - remains significant.  Yet the continuing importance of family 
business demonstrates that kinship can still be a match for the forces of markets and 
“rational” decision-making.  I will argue that the reason for this is the unique connection 
of kinship with a culture’s normative order.  This very connection is simultaneously the 
source of the costs that kinship exacts on business. 
The moral order of kinship is at odds with the amoral logic of markets.  Norms of 
the hearth, of kin, of family, revolve at one pole of exchange: long-term generalized 
reciprocity.  Norms of the market revolve at the other pole again: short-term balanced 
reciprocity (Sahlins, 1972, pp. 194-196) and “the unidirectional [rather than 
accommodating] aspect of property” (Schweitzer, 2000a, p. 212; also Fortes, 1969; 
Freedman, 1958, pp. 26-27; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, p. 128; Marcus with Hill, 
1992, p. 41).  This argument was developed by Maurice Bloch in two papers (1971, 
1973) inspired by Meyer Fortes’ concept of the “axiom of amity”: “Kinship concepts, 
institutions, and relations classify, identify, and categorize persons and groups. … this is 
associated with rules of conduct whose efficacy comes, in the last resort, from a general 
principle of kinship morality that is rooted in the familial domain and is assumed 
everywhere to be axiomatically binding.  This is the principle of prescriptive altruism 
which I have referred to as the principle of kinship amity” (Fortes, 1969, pp. 231-232).  
Bloch (1973, p. 76) paraphrases the normative value as one of “sharing without 
reckoning” (see also Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987; Long, 1979; Song, 1999, pp. 82-83, 
88-89; see Holy, 1996, p. 45 for restrictions on Fortes’ intended use of the axiom).   
“Sharing without reckoning”: this cannot be the slogan of the market.  In contexts 
where generalized reciprocity dominates market principles of exchange, “family 
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obligations can interfere with economic performance” (Whyte, 1996, p. 14).  
Entrepreneurs must resist normative pressures to support their extended families if they 
wish to reinvest in their firms (Belshaw, 1965; Bloch, 1973; Hart, 1975; Holy, 1996, p. 
110; Nafziger, 1969; Whyte, 1996).   They must impose economic, meritocratic criteria 
for participation in firms in kinship contexts where mere relatedness is the “sufficient” 
(Scheffler, 2001) condition.  This need to “disembed” (Stewart, 1990) from traditional 
relationships is a prima facie indication of costs to kinship where kinship trumps 
economics. 
Disembedding from societal norms itself carries costs in lost legitimation, and 
risks (such as witchcraft accusations) attendant on nonconformity (Gates, 1993; Geertz, 
1967; Oxfeld, 1993, p. 95; Watson, 1985, p. 163).  As a consequence, early in the life of 
the family firm or the entrepreneurial career, it may be necessary to begin “re-
embedding” by means of conspicuous acts of generosity and patronage.  These costs may 
be high, because a typical behavior of traditional entrepreneurs is a continuous flow of 
gifts as a means of creating an indebted following (Barth, 1959, pp. 77-80; Lomnitz & 
Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, p. 13; Stewart, 1990; A. Strathern, 1971). 
Kinship-focused actors can feel the need for conspicuous generosity even where 
economic norms dominate.  Scions of long-standing, “dynastic” family firms face a 
disjunction between the family firms and modern societal norms.  In her study of large 
Portuguese family firms, de Lima (2000, p. 152) detected “a profound sense of 
contradiction” on the part of family members, torn between norms of meritocracy and 
norms of dynastic succession.  Marcus and Hall (1992, p. 20) found a similar 
“ambivalence” on the part of descendants of dynastic families within the United States.  
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These dynasties face the challenge of retaining the affiliation of descendants whose 
allegiances have been redirected by prevailing norms of individualism and nuclear 
families.  In older family firms, particularly when family members are no longer active in 
the business, dynasties seek to reconcile their norms with those of the host society by 
means of a compulsive philanthropy (Marcus & Hall, 1992, pp. 110-112).  Similarly, 
some dynastic families (and even first-generation entrepreneurs) may seek legitimation 
by investments in assets, such as ranches, with low productivity but high prestige (Bruun, 
1993, p. 13; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987). 
Business logic secondary to kinship logic.  When kinship logic supercedes 
business logic, the rationale for operating decisions may appear to be “technical” (Pérez-
Lizaur, 1997, p. 544) but be based instead on the short-term consumption needs of the 
owners: “trips, cars, money for… daughters, mothers and sisters” and so on (as above; 
also Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, pp. 11, 13, 105, 116-117).  Similarly, the right to 
managerial influence may be based not on expertise but on kinship position and the 
ownership of kinship property (Greenhalgh, 1994).  In this case, where kinship logic 
overrules economic logic in the labor market the phenomenon, of course, is nepotism. 
 Nepotism.  Even in family firms in the so-called Confucian (Greenhalgh, 1994) 
environment of Hong Kong, “nepotism” is a disparaged phenomenon (Wong, 1988, pp. 
136-137, 142-143).  The reasons are obvious.  When kinship position takes priority over 
experience and capability, a certain cost is a breach in the link between performance and 
rewards (Belshaw, 1965; Ram & Holliday, 1993).  A heavier cost can be the promotion 
of incompetents who cannot be dismissed (Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, p. 112; 
Whyte, 1996).  In some cultures this pattern coexists with control by a patriarch (or group 
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of brothers) with wide latitude in hiring, firing, and salary determinations (Greenhalgh, 
1994; Leyton, 1970). 
 When authoritarian kinship systems give rise to authoritarian firms the tensions 
caused by nepotism are drawn in sharp relief, but nepotism causes tensions irregardless.  
It does so partly by generating opportunity costs of two types.  First, it reduces the ability 
of the new generations to find optimal uses for their talents in open labor markets (see 
Song, 1999, pp. 88, 92; Whyte, 1996).  Second, it reduces the ability of non-kin and 
disadvantaged kin to make optimal use of their talents in the internal labor markets. 
When kinship logic supercedes economic logic, it can lead to delegitimation 
within the firm itself.  For example, in many cultures the male leaders of the kin groups 
dominate financial management and monopolize external network ties (Chiu, 1998; 
Dhaliwal, 1998; Lu, 2001; Oxfeld, 1993, pp. 145-147).  As a consequence, women and 
other disadvantaged kin and affines may feel themselves exploited and lose faith in the 
equity of the family firms (Dhaliwal, 1998; Song, 1999, pp. 110-111). 
In many such cultures family members resolve perceived inequities (among men) 
by dividing the family estate and starting new branches of the firm.  This solution is 
creative and enduring (Goody, 1996, pp. 143, 155, 203) but not without its tensions.  In 
divisions, both the timing of the split and the allocation of assets are sources of dispute 
(Oxfeld, 1993, p. 181).  In contexts of joint ownership and effort but distinctions in 
abilities and responsibilities it is difficult to reach agreement on credit for success or 
blame for failure (Blim, 1990, pp. 191-192; Oxfeld, 1993, pp. 165, 191-196).  This 
problem is explicit in customary Chinese law which “recognized two kinds of property, 
the ‘inherited assets’ transmitted from the ancestors and the ‘acquired property’” 
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developed by entrepreneurs (Greenhalgh, 1994, p. 756; also Goody, 1997; Wong, 1988, 
pp. 152-155).  Consensual attributions about the sources of “acquired property” are rare. 
 Difficulties in allocating credit and blame are scarcely unique to family firms, but 
nepotism does exacerbate them by slanting official attributions towards non-merit-based 
criteria.  Bias harms both disadvantaged relatives and non-kin employees.  Inherent 
fissures between kin and non-kin and between core kin and peripheral kin create a vicious 
cycle of distrust (Wong, 1988, p. 103 for the phrase “vicious cycle”; also Geertz, 1967; 
Greenhalgh, 1994; Hart, 1975; Leyton, 1970; Lu, 2001; Whyte, 1996).  Like any cycle it 
could begin anywhere; let us start with the monopolization of authority and key rewards 
among the core kin.  The result is perceived inequities among other employees and non-
core kin.  This in turn leads to “unreliable” behaviors such as turnover, which, of course, 
leads to reinforced views among core kin members that outsiders are unreliable. 
This problem is likely most salient for firms that manage their finances with a 
goal of private, familial purposes.  In these cases, highly sensitive information about side-
dealings and other arrangements that would be inappropriate if the firms were publicly 
traded (consider Enron) creates an even greater need for confianza, (as Mexican owners 
express it, Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, p. 119) 
THE PROFITS OF KINSHIP 
Despite these disadvantages, family firms have been so successful through time 
and space (Goody, 1996) that kinship must offer benefits that outbalance the costs.  Of 
course, these benefits do not necessarily accrue to the firm as such.  They may accrue to 
some but not other family members, or to neither the family members nor the family 
firm.  Some of the benefits of kinship accrue to the firm’s service providers (Marcus & 
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Hall, 1992, pp. 5, 353).  They can also benefit the family qua family.  For example, the 
benefits of kinship can revolve around “emotion, mental health, [and] group cohesion” 
Schweitzer (2000b, p. 16).  They can include the “proper upbringing of young children” 
in a setting with the preferred social norms (Goody, 1996, p. 141).  Further, a successful 
family firm can facilitate the re-unification of nuclear families and the longevity of the 
undivided joint family (Bruun 1993, p. 32; Harrell, 1993; Long, 1979; Song, 1999, p. 75).  
The consequent task, often undertaken by women, of organizing communication in 
extended families is also facilitated by the success of the firm (de Lima, 2000; Johnson, 
2000; Ram & Holliday, 1993). 
Unfortunately, the intention that the business preserve family solidarity can be 
frustrated by the isolating effects of working at close quarters in a busy operation that 
allows little opportunity for family communication or leisure (Song, 1999, pp. 87, 108, 
121-122).  Family itself can be frustrating for its members.  Whereas some entrepreneurs 
become business leaders in order to become kinship leaders (Belshaw, 1965; Geertz, 
1967; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, p. 13; Wong, 1988, p. 164), other entrepreneurs on 
the contrary become business leaders in order to escape from kinship constraints (Gates, 
1993; Harrell, 1993).  The Chinese female entrepreneurs that Gates studied seem not to 
have found that the benefits of kinship for business applied in their case. 
Benefits for Business 
 Access to resources.  Relatives (affines and kin) are universally sources of capital 
for startup firms (Benedict, 1968; Learned, 1995; Mattessich & Hill, 1976; Nafziger, 
1969; A. Strathern, 1971, pp. 154, 196-197).  Even in countries with advanced capital 
markets, relatives provide capital in quantities that would not be worth the due diligence 
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costs of professional providers (Learned, 1995).  Relatives provide not only capital but 
also living expenses during startups (Hart, 1975).  They also pool their resources - as do 
conjugal mates - to generate sufficient capital (Harrell, 1993; Hart, 1975). 
Relatives provide a diffuse, long-term source of social support that underwrites 
the capacity of entrepreneurs to take short-term risks (Benedict, 1968; Goody, 1996, p. 
141; Greenhalgh, 1989; Mattessich & Hill, 1976).  Extensive networks of affines and kin 
also provide a major source of mentoring (A. Strathern, 1971, p. 199), access to business 
channels and markets (Benedict, 1968; Goody, 1996, pp. 120, 150) and information 
(Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, pp. 118, 120; Schneider & Schneider, 1976, pp. 41-42, 
48, 55; Watson, 1985, p. 174).  Networks of social support and of information can, of 
course, be based on non-kinship bases such as ethnicity (Cohen, 1969; Leyton, 1970).  
Kinship, however, plays a particularly important role in these networks, which raises the 
question of the character of kinship that lends itself to this purpose. 
A cryptic answer to this question is offered by Marcus and Hall (1992, p. 131): 
“The power of dynastic wealth is its power to be conspiratorial, to make secret deals, that 
is, to pull together resources from across various social and institutional spheres to pursue 
a single aim… The residual strength of dynasties, similar to [that of] lineages… is that 
they integrate functions and activities that specialized institutional orders differentiate 
and fragment”.  This proposition has three components: secrecy, generality, and 
integration across social fields.  The link between kinship and secrecy is straightforward 
(Benedict, 1968; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, 119).  The link with generality and 
integration is less obvious. 
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The link is the reflection in kinship, rather than in specialized realms such as 
markets, of the moral order of the society as a whole.  This moral order is rooted in 
generalized reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi, 1957, pp. 46, 49, 52-54; cf. Mengzi, 
4th c. B.C. (Lau, 1970, p. 92)).  The persistence of kinship-based enterprise implies that 
Polanyi (1957, p. 57) was wrong to believe that in market societies “instead of economy 
being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic 
system.”  Indeed, Goody (1996, p. 102) holds that the notion of “the Great Divide” 
postulated by Polanyi “is plainly wrong.”  I suspect that even now economic activity is 
more deeply embedded in kinship than in other ties, more typically cited by 
embeddedness theorists, such as friendship and co-ethnicity (Granovetter, 1985; cf. 
Stewart, 1990).  
In his 1971 article Bloch argued that kin terms make reference to the totality of a 
culture’s constant principles of right and wrong.  Two years later (Bloch, 1973, p. 87) he 
made the connection between this moral character of kinship and its generality: “The 
selective [evolutionary] value of kinship is precisely the combination of the many 
functions which it can perform without it being reduced either in character or in time to 
any single one… it is the generality of kinship and the continuity of kinship which is of 
prime significance and these features are due to its morality.”  Moreover, “Kinship… 
relationships… provide potential cooperation continuing through the vicissitudes of 
time… For long-term planning, only social relationships which are reliable in the long-
term can be used and this reliability comes from morality” (Bloch, 1973, p. 79).  The 
persistence of ties infused with norms of generalized reciprocity, and with low “social 
costs” (Long, 1979, p. 152), provides a “group insurance against failure” (Greenhalgh, 
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1989, p. 90) that empowers the entrepreneur to take risks with other, arms-length 
commercial relationships (see Polanyi, 1957, p. 61).  A moral order of generalized 
reciprocity undergirds any enterprise culture. 
Extensive weak ties, strategic strong ties.  “Entrepreneurs [need] particularly 
extensive weak ties, and strategic strong ties” (Stewart, 1990, p. 149).  For access to 
information, entrepreneurial families make particularly good use of weak ties through 
their extended families and affines (Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, p. 118; Schneider & 
Schneider, 1976, pp. 73-74).  Strategic marriages are important because they provide 
points of network entry based on “strong ties with well-connected people [who] are 
needed to set in motion particular indirect effects” (Stewart, 1990, p. 149; for affinity see 
Watson 1985, pp. 117, 128-129, 132-133, 156-163, 172, 226-227).  Strong ties are 
needed for networking with distant or weak ties, and not only for their more obvious 
value in the mobilization and management of people within the family firm. 
The internal value of strong ties is, certainly, considerable.  Affines and kin (that 
is, people with very strong ties) provide sources of labor (e.g., Blim, 1990; Greenhalgh, 
1989, 1994); not only labor but labor with advantages for the firm.  Family members 
have been found to be more committed (Mattessich & Hill, 1976), harder working 
(Benedict, 1968; Ram & Holliday, 1993) and longer-serving than non-family members 
(Song, 1999, p. 10; Wong, 1988, p. 68).  Because of their tacit knowledge both of the 
firm and one another, they are easier to coordinate and more adaptable as conditions 
change (Benedict, 1968; Greenhalgh, 1989; Ram & Holliday, 1993).  For example, the 
family can reduce its consumption during economic downturns and expand hours worked 
during upturns (Blim, 1990, p. 118; Song, 1999, p. 85).  Labor costs are also generally 
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lower than for non-relatives (Benedict, 1968; Greenhalgh, 1989; Lu, 2001; Mattessich & 
Hill, 1976; Wong, 1988, p. 143).  Moreover, while family firms respond to highly 
uncertain environments with a short-term planning horizon (Bruun, 1993, p. 13; Pérez-
Lizaur, 1997; Whyte, 1996), in more settled environments they adopt very long time 
horizons.  This facilitates the patient investment of education and training in family 
members (Benedict, 1968; de Lima, 2000; Goody, 1996, pp. 182-183; 193; Nafziger, 
1969). 
How can family members be mobilized?  Family firms mobilize family 
members.  But family members surely do not permit their own mobilization as purely 
unproblematic extensions of kinship obligations.  Members are not, after all, purely 
kinship beings bereft of tactical intentions of their own.  Clearly, not all family members 
prefer to work for the family firm (Chiu, 1998; Dhaliwal, 1998, Song, 1999, pp. 88, 92, 
110-111).  In order to explain their mobilization, we need to consider the purely tactical, 
the purely moral, and the tactical use of the moral. 
Perhaps the least important is the purely tactical; that is, the manipulation and 
calculation of self-interest alone.  The most raw and Hobbesian mode of recruitment, 
authoritarian power, appears to be rare but is not unheard of (Song, 1999, pp. 73, 110).  
More subtly, the authority differentials of kinship systems can offer opportunities for the 
mobilization of familial resources by kin group leaders (Greenhalgh, 1989).  Kin-based 
hierarchies can form the model for organized action in the economic realm (Watson, 
1985, pp. 35, 38, 47-48, 163). 
Family members also join in the family enterprise because of low opportunity 
costs in the external job market (Blim, 1990, p. 155; Chiu, 1998; Wong, 1988, p. 144).  
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Golden handcuffs further increase the differential.  In the case of ethnic family firms 
studied by Leyton (1970, p. 184), “dependence is maintained by ensuring that any 
director or salesman enjoys and becomes accustomed to a standard of living out of reach 
of his own earning power” (see also Long, 1979).  Similarly, members may calculate the 
value of their possible inheritance of the business.  Common also is awareness of the 
family’s financial need for labor contributions (Chiu, 1998; Song, 1999, pp. 76, 84, 114).  
This awareness leads to an internalization of external market forces that operate as a 
social control mechanism in the firm; hence, it has been called “market discipline” in a 
non-family context (Stewart, 1989, p. 44).  Market discipline is the internalization of 
instrumental logic and as such is both moral and tactical. 
Familial members also internalize familial values, such as long-term reciprocity, 
filial obligation and hard work for one’s family (Chiu, 1998; Oxfeld, 1993, p. 160; Song, 
1999, pp. 82-83, 106-108).  Because these values are typically implicit and enacted over 
many years beginning at very young ages, they exert considerable force (Dhaliwal, 1998; 
Song, 1999, pp. 81, 117-119).  They may be reinforced by the younger generation’s 
identification with their ethnic minority communities and a sense of equity regarding the 
travails of the parental generation (Song, 1999, pp. 76-79, 87, 110, 114).  Although these 
values are often unexpressed, older members are not reluctant to invoke them in an effort 
to attract and retain family labor.  At least in the case of Chinese cultures, filial ideologies 
are used to manipulate feelings of guilt for those who do not actively pitch into the 
business (Song, 1999, pp. 101-102, 111, 113).  For the recalcitrant, peer pressure can also 
be applied (Leyton, 1970; Song, 1999, p. 123).  On balance, the informal “family work 
contracts” between the generations are morally construed: they are “understood in terms 
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of nonexacting, generalized forms of reciprocity over the long term” (Song, 1999, p. 89; 
referring to Bloch on the previous page; see Chap. 4 generally).  Therefore, the root of 
kinship’s costs to business - its discrepancy from market norms - is also the root of 
kinship’s benefits for business.  However, as Bloch argued, the moral can also be used for 
tactical, pragmatic ends (Bloch, 1971; Bennett & Despres, 1998; Song, 1999, pp. 82-88; 
Stewart, 1990; M. Strathern, 1985).  
At a high level of abstraction, we can say that entrepreneurs profit by bridging 
differing spheres of social life to exploit discrepant valuations across space and time 
(Barth, 1967; Rumelt, 1987).  To do this, they need certain skills in both moral orders and 
tactical practice if they are to mobilize supporters and serve customer needs.  Family 
business entrepreneurs must be particularly adroit in sensing the resources and the limits 
that moral obligations provide them.  They draw upon more social resources than other 
entrepreneurs, but these resources reference a moral order that would not lightly code 
them as “resources”.  The lines between consensual duties to the family and exploitations 
of feeling are fine.  Only a leader immersed in both moral and tactical worlds can direct 
kin-based cooperative effort to instrumental ends.  
CONCLUSION 
 Few business school scholars are trained in anthropology, but it is possible for 
them to borrow bundles of concepts from anthropology, or if not full-fledged concepts at 
least sensitivities to sets of variables or dimensions that can be identified.  Examples of 
themes in the present paper are the reasons that relatives work in family firms, the 
temporal dynamics of embeddedness, and the tensions between the moral and tactical 
dimensions of kinship. 
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Borrowing from anthropology can also broaden our bounding of the family 
business field.  It may be preferable to think of kinship-based rather than family business.  
One problem with the term “family” is the infeasibility of defining the term either 
functionally or structurally in a cross-culturally valid way (Harrell, 1997, pp. 3-4; Holy, 
1996, pp. 57, 67; Pine, 1996; Terrell, 1997; admittedly, similar arguments have been 
made about “kinship”).  Two advantages of thinking of kinship-based business are the 
range and analytical depth of the scholarship upon which one can draw, and the broader 
scope of investigation implied.  Take for example the case, apparently common, of a new 
firm capitalized by investments by the owner’s parents’ wealthy friends (Learned, 1995).  
These investors are not relatives and the firm would not, by this measure alone, be 
defined as a “family business”.  However, the transaction that launched the business was 
kin-based.  The investors provided capital to the particular person they chose precisely 
because of his filiation to their friends. 
Limitations. 
As is customary, I do lament the modesty of my contribution relative to the 
advances that could be achieved.  Many crucial issues have surely gone unrecognized.  I 
have ignored the toolbox of analytical tools and techniques, such as particular uses of 
social network analysis (e.g., Houseman & White, 1998; White & Jorion, 1992).  Only 
cursory notice has been given to topical areas of great importance, such as devolution of 
rights and property to succeeding generations.  Also deserving more attention is the 
closely related topic of conflict, which has also been considered by many anthropologists 
(e.g., Scheffler, 2001).  More generally, I have undoubtedly oversimplified both the 
ethnographic record and kinship theory.  I have certainly not tried to answer some of the 
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knottiest questions, such as why it is true - if indeed it is - that relationships modeled on 
genealogy might be reference points for ultimate morality (Carstens, 2000; Freeman, 
1973).  Freudian and Fortesian explanations are beyond me here (personal 
communication with D. P. Lumsden, who was Fortes’ student at Cambridge). 
Possibilities for further development.  Another limitation of this paper is that I 
have not synthesized anthropology and business school writings. Great potential exists 
for this pursuit.  For example, tensions between the family and business “systems” are 
important topics in family business writings based on family studies and clinical 
psychology (e.g., Dyer, 1992; Rosenblatt, et al., 1985).  These approaches could be 
compared with anthropological thinking on the moral and tactical, the long-term and the 
short, balanced and generalized reciprocity. 
Within anthropology itself, there is a limitation that business school scholars may 
be able to remedy.  Many topics in kinship-based business, such as the process by which 
kin become attached to family firms, can be adequately depicted only with detailed, 
longitudinal studies of specific settings.  Anthropology has a tradition of these sorts of 
studies with a focus on kinship, such as Gulliver (1971), Turner (1957) and Van Velsen 
(1964), or with a focus on the workplace (Kapferer, 1969, 1972).  None of these studies 
pays much attention to both kinship and business.  Kapferer’s studies are unusual in 
taking as the unit of observation such a small-scale field as the workplace.  Ethnographic 
work on kinship typically takes as its unit a larger social entity such as a lineage group 
(Watson, 1985) or ethnic minority specializing in a given industry (Oxfeld, 1993).  With 
these examples, the people who were studied ran formal business organizations.  Other 
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people who have been studied include entrepreneurial actors who lack such organizations 
(e.g., Barth, 1959; Gulliver, 1971; A. Strathern, 1971). 
Even the best of the ethnographic studies of kinship-based businesses, such as 
Oxfeld (1993), Song (1999) and Wong (1988), derive their firm-level data from 
interviews.  Interviews have many virtues but learning how people actually behave is not 
one of them (Stewart, 1998, pp. 26-28).  Nor are interviews the heart of anthropological 
method.  If we are to have a fully anthropological - that is, ethnographic - understanding 
of kin-based businesses, business school scholars will need to do more than merely 
borrow.  They will need to conduct ethnographies themselves.  If they do so, I hope that 
they will incorporate into their thinking the long and living tradition of anthropological 
kinship theory. 
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